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Characterization of threshold functions: state of the art,
some new contributions and open problems
Josep Freixas∗, Marc Freixas† and Sascha Kurz‡
Abstract
This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the
isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold
logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main purposes in both theories is to
determine when a simple game is representable as a weighted game, which allows a very
compact and easily comprehensible representation. Deep results were found in threshold
logic in the sixties and seventies for this problem. However, game theory has taken the lead
and some new results have been obtained for the problem in the last two decades. The
second and main goal of this paper is to provide some new results on this problem and
propose several open questions and conjectures for future research. The results we obtain
depend on two significant parameters of the game: the number of types of equivalent players
and the number of types of shift-minimal winning coalitions.
Key words: simple games; weighted games; characterization of weighted games; trade robust-
ness; invariant-trade robustness, asummability AMS codes: 91A12; 06E30; 94C10; 68T27;
92B20
1 Introduction
The study of switching functions goes back at least to Dedekind’s 1897 work [9], in which he
determined the exact number of simple games with four or fewer players. Since that time these
structures have been investigated in a variety of different contexts either theoretically [26, 29,
28, 30, 5] in the context of Boolean functions or because of their numerous applications: neural
networks [1], simple games [48, 34, 35, 51], threshold logic [13, 8, 25, 33, 44], hypergraphs [54],
coherent structures [53], learning theory [42], complexity theory [4], and secret sharing [57, 59, 3].
Several books on neural networks have studied these structures: [49, 55, 58, 52].
Logic gates, switching functions or Boolean functions can be thought of as simple games, with
weighted games playing the role of threshold functions. To the best of our knowledge the first
work linking threshold logic and simple games is due to Dubey and Shapley [11] and a compact
study encompassing knowledge in both fields is due to Taylor and Zwicker [63].
As an example for a switching function or a simple game one may consider the process of
coordination of the weekend activities of a family. Assume that the family consists of the parents
Ann and Bob and their children Claire and Dylan. A proposal is accepted if at least one of the
parents and at least one of the children agrees, while each person can either agree or disagree.
∗Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya (Campus Manresa), in the Department of Mathematics; Av. Bases de
Manresa, 61-73, E-08242 Manresa, Spain.
†Industrial Engineer working for Cirprotec, E-08233 Terrassa, Spain.
‡University of Bayreuth, in the Department of Mathematics; 95440 Bayreuth, Germany.
1
The underlying decision rule can be modeled as a simple game.1 A compact way to represent
a simple game is by using weights for each player such that a proposal is accepted if and only
if the weight sum of its supporters meets or exceeds a given quota (or threshold). If such a
representation exists, the simple game is called a weighted game. In our example no weighted
representation exists, since the coalitions of the parents and of the children cannot push through
a proposal, while they can if they split differently in coalitions of size two.2 However, every simple
game can be written as the intersection of some weighted games. The Lisbon voting rules of the
EU Council provide a non-weighted real–world example where quite a few weighted games are
need in such a representation, see [40] for the details.
One of the most fundamental questions in all of the above mentioned areas is to characterize
which monotonic switching functions (simple games) are weighted threshold functions (weighted
games). In threshold logic this is known as the linear separability problem. This question has
also been posed in other research fields by using different terminologies, which are essentially
equivalent. Three different treatments to solve this problem have been considered.
The first consists in studying the consistency of a system of inequalities. Each inequality
is formed by the inner product of two vectors: a non-negative integer vector of weights which
represents the unknown variables and the vector formed by the subtraction of a true vector
(winning coalition) minus a false vector (losing coalition). The system is formed by considering
all possible subtractions of true and false vectors. If the switching function is a threshold function
then each inequality must be positive and the system of inequalities is consistent. A theorem on
the existence of solutions for systems of linear inequalities was given in [7]. Linear programming
is also a useful tool as shown in [41, 16].
The second treatment, very close to the previous one, is a geometric approach based on the
existence of a separating hyperplane that separates true vectors from false vectors. This procedure
is elegant but not very efficient in practice. A use of the geometrical approach can be found in [12].
Reference [32] proposes a variant of it.
The idea behind the third approach lies in the consideration of exchanges among vectors
and the possibility to convert some true vectors into false vectors, no matter the number of
vectors involved in these exchanges. The early works of [13] and [8], reexamined for simple games
in [61], are the central point of this work. The class of threshold functions admits a structural
characterization, the asummability property, that is both natural and elegant. Some of the
deepest results on this subject were obtained in the area of threshold logic during two decades
from the fifties to the seventies by Chow, Elgot, Gabelman and Winder, as reported by Hu [33],
and continued by Muroga [44] and Muroga et al. [46, 45, 47].
The interpretation of Taylor and Zwicker for the asummability condition in terms of trades
among coalitions in [61] together with the work in [62] stimulated the interest for the problem of
characterizing weighted games within simple games. In their book [63] they adapted, for simple
games, the most important results of threshold logic in relation to the linear separability problem.
In particular, their property of trade-robustness is equivalent to the property of asummability.
However, trade-robustness is more transparent in the theoretical context of voting since it gives
rise to some intuitions concerning the idea of trading players among coalitions. Freixas and
Molinero [17] propose a relaxation of trade-robustness for complete simple games and called
it invariant-trade robustness, which is less costly in terms of the lenght of the corresponding
certificates. In this paper we deduce some new results using this property.
As mentioned before, each simple can can be represented as an intersection of weighted games,
which allows a compact representation once the number of required weighted games is small. In
1The minimal winning coalitions are given by {A,C}, {A,D}, {B,C}, and {B,D}, see Section 2 for the
definitions.
2Using the notation from Section 3, 〈{A,C}, {B,D} ‖ {A,B}, {C,D}〉 is a trading transform, which certifies
non-weightedness.
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general this number, called dimension of the simple game, can be large, see e.g. [39], where the
worst case asymptotics has been determined via a connection to coding theory. If the dimension
is small, e.g. power indices can in general be more simply and efficiently computed. Here we treat
the extreme case of dimension 1, i.e., we consider the relavant issue whether a given simple game
(switching function) is weighted and propose some new characterizations.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The necessary basic terminology of simple games
is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 recalls the main general results on the characterization of
weighted games within the class of simple games, and it identifies the analogue terminologies
used in threshold logic and simple games. The problem of the characterization of weighted games
can be restricted to the class of complete games, a parametrization result for classifying them,
up to isomorphisms, which will be intensively used in the next sections, is recalled in Section
4. Sections 5, 6 and 7 provide new results on the characterization of weighted games. Cases for
which 2-invariant trade robustness is conclusive are presented in Section 5. m-invariant trade
robustness is studied in Section 6, while Section 7 gives some numerical and experimental data.
Several questions and conjectures are proposed for future research in Section 8. In Section 9 we
draw a conclusion.
2 Terminology in the context of voting simple games
Simple games or binary voting systems can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a
single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game
G is a pair (N,W) in which N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players or voters and W is a collection
of subsets of N that satisfies: (1) N ∈ W , (2) ∅ /∈ W and (3) the monotonicity property: S ∈ W
and S ⊆ T ⊆ N implies T ∈ W .
Any set of voters is called a coalition, and the set N is called the grand coalition. Members of
N are called players or voters, and the subsets of N that are in W are called winning coalitions.
The intuition here is that a set S is a winning coalition if and only if the bill or amendment
passes when the players in S are precisely the ones who voted for it. A subset of N that is not
in W is called a losing coalition. A minimal winning coalition is a winning coalition all of whose
proper subsets are losing. A maximal losing coalition is a losing coalition all of whose proper
supersets are winning. Because of monotonicity, any simple game is completely determined by
its set of minimal winning coalitions, which is denoted by Wm or by its set of maximal losing
coalitions, which is denoted here LM . A voter a ∈ N is null if a does not belong to any minimal
winning coalition. A player a ∈ N has veto if a belongs to all winning coalitions.
Before proceeding, we present two real-world examples of simple games (see Taylor and
Pacelli [60] for a thorough presentation of these two examples).
Example 2.1 The United Nations Security Council. The voters in this system are the fifteen
countries that make up the Security Council, five of which are permanent members whereas the
other ten are non-permanent members. Passage requires a total of at least nine of the fifteen
possible votes, subject to a veto due to a no vote from any one of the five permanent members.
This model ignores abstention. For a treatment of this example considering the possibility of
abstention we refer the reader to [23].
Example 2.2 The System to amend the Canadian Constitution. Since 1982, an amendment
to the Canadian Constitution can become law only if it is approved by at least seven out of the
ten Canadian provinces, subject to the proviso that the approving provinces have, among them,
at least half of Canada’s population. It was first studied in Kilgour [37]. An old census (in
percentages) for the Canadian provinces was: 1. Ontario (34%), 2. Quebec (29%), 3. British
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Columbia (9%), 4. Alberta (7%), 5. Saskatchewan (5%), 6. Manitoba (5%), 7. Nova Scotia
(4%), 8. New Brunswick (3%), 9. Newfoundland (3%), 10. Prince Edward Island (1%).
For example observe that coalitions (from now on we use abridgments to denote the provinces):
X1 = {Que,BC,Alb, Sas,Man,NS,NB} and X2 = {Ont, Sas,Man,NS,NB,Newf, PEI} are
minimal winning coalitions because they both have exactly 7 provinces and their total population
surpasses the 50%. Instead, coalitions:
Y1 = {Ont,Que, Sas,Man,NS,NB} and Y2 = {BC,Alb, Sas,Man,NS,NB,Newf, PEI} are
both losing because Y1 does not have 7 or more members and Y2 does not reach the 50% of the
total Canada’s population.
A fundamental subclass of simple games are the classes of weighted simple games and complete
simple games. A simple gameG = (N,W) is said to be weighted if there exists a “weight function”
w : N → R≥0 and a “quota” q ∈ R>0 such that a coalition S is winning precisely when the sum
of the weights of the players in S meets or exceeds the quota. Any specific example of such a
weight function w : N → R and quota q are said to realize G as a weighted game. A particular
realization of a weighted simple game is denoted as [q;w1, . . . , wn].
For instance, [k;
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1] for some k = 1, . . . , n is a feasible realization for a weighted game in
which all players are symmetric; here the game is called a k–out–of–n simple game. A realization
of Example 2.1 is [39; 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1], where 7 is the weight for a permanent
member and 1 the weight for a non-permanent member. Instead, Example 2.2 cannot be repre-
sented as a weighted game. Indeed, if the game was weighted we would have w(X1) > w(Y1) and
w(X2) > w(Y2), i.e.,
w2+(w3+ · · ·+w8) > (w1+w2)+(w5+ · · ·+w8) and w1+(w5+ · · ·+w10) > (w3+ · · ·+w10).
After simplification we obtain w3+w4 > w1 and w1 > w3+w4, which is a contradiction. In these
inequalities, w1 represents, the weight for Ontario, the most populated province; w2 represents,
the weight for Quebec, the second most populated province; and so on.
It is quite intuitive to observe that a permanent member has more influence than a non-
permanent member in the voting systems described in Example 2.1. The same occurs in Exam-
ple 2.2 where any of the two big provinces are more influential than any other of the remaining
eight provinces. The “desirability relation” represents a way to make the idea, that a particular
voting system may give to one voter more influence than another, more precise. Isbell already
used it in [35].
Let G = (N,W) be a simple game, a and b be two voters. Player a is said to be at least
as desirable as b as coalitional partner if for every coalition S such that a /∈ S and b /∈ S,
S ∪ {b} ∈ W implies S ∪ {a} ∈ W . If moreover, there exists a coalition T such that a /∈ T and
b /∈ T , T ∪ {a} ∈ W and T ∪ {b} /∈ W , then a is (strictly) more desirable than b. Finally, a and b
are said to be equally desirable if a is at least as desirable as b and the converse is also true. The
notations a % b, a ≻ b and a ∼ b respectively stand for: a is at least as desirable as b, a is strictly
more desirable than b, and a and b are equally desirable. It is straightforward to check that ∼ is
an equivalence relation, and that the desirability relation % is a partial ordering of the resulting
equivalence classes.
A simple game G = (N,W) is complete (or linear) if the desirability relation is a complete
preordering. Note that every weighted game is complete, since for any realization it holds that
wa ≥ wb implies a % b. But the converse is not true as Example 2.2 shows.
In a complete simple game we may decompose N into a collection of subsets, called classes,
N1 > N2 > · · · > Nt forming a partition of N . Those classe should be the equivalence classes
ordered by desirability, i.e., if a ∈ Np and b ∈ Nq then: p = q if and only if a ∼ b and, p < q if
and only if a ≻ b. Two parameters are of fundamental importance in our study. One of them is
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the number of equivalence classes, t, in a complete game, i.e., a measurement of heterogeneity.
In Example 2.1 we have N1 > N2 where N1 is formed by the five permanent members and N2
for the non-permanent ones, while in Example 2.2 we have N1 > N2, where N1 is formed by the
two big provinces and N2 for the other eight provinces. Thus, in both examples t = 2.
To define the second fundamental parameter for our study we need another definition. Given
a simple game, a shift-minimal winning coalition S is a minimal winning coalition such that
(S \ {a}) ∪ {b} is losing whenever a ≻ b with a ∈ S and b /∈ S. Note that a coalition of seven
members in Example 2.2 containing both, Quebec and Ontario, is a minimal winning coalition
but it is not shift-minimal winning, since a replacement of a big province in the coalition for
a province not belonging to the coalition still leaves the new coalition winning. Analogously, a
shift-maximal losing coalition S is a maximal losing coalition such that (S \ {b})∪{a} is winning
whenever a ≻ b with b ∈ S and a /∈ S.
Two shift-minimal winning coalitions, S and T , are said to be equivalent coalitions if T can
be obtained from S by any sequence of one–to–one exchanges of equally desirable voters. If the
game is complete we can consider the parameter r which is the maximal number of non-equivalent
shift-minimal winning coalitions.
Observe that the complete game from Example 2.1 has
(
10
4
)
= 210 minimal winning coalitions
which are also shift-minimal winning coalitions, each consisting of all five permanent members
and four arbitrary non-permanent members. However, all of them are equivalent in the previous
sense. Thus, for Example 2.1 the two parameters we lay stress on are r = 1 and t = 2.
The simple game from Example 2.2 has 112 minimal winning coalitions, 56 of them formed
by one of the two big provinces and six other provinces, which are also shift-minimal winning
coalitions. The game has 56 additional winning coalitions formed by the two big provinces and
five other provinces, but these are not shift-minimal winning coalitions. The 56 shift-minimal
winning coalitions are equivalent among them in the previous sense. Thus, for Example 2.2 the
two parameters we lay stress on again are r = 1 and t = 2. The case r = 1 is considered in
Subsection 5.1.
3 Some results on the characterization of weighted games
We introduce a notion of trades among coalitions, which is natural in game theory and in economic
applications, see [63] for motivating examples. Suppose G = (N,W) is a simple game. Then a
trading transform is a coalition sequence 〈X1, . . . , Xk|Y1, . . . , Yk〉 of even length satisfying the
following condition:
|{i : a ∈ Xi}| = |{i : a ∈ Yi}| for all a ∈ N.
The Xs are called the pre-trade coalitions and the Y s are called the post-trade coalitions. A
k-trade for a simple game G is a trading transform 〈X1, . . . , Xj |Y1, . . . , Yj〉 with j ≤ k. The
simple game G is k-trade robust if there is no trading transform for which all the Xs are winning
in G and all the Y s are losing in G. If G is k-trade robust for all k ∈ N, then G is said to be
trade robust.
Loosely speaking, G is k-trade robust if a sequence of k or fewer (not necessarily distinct)
winning coalitions can never be rendered losing by a trade.
Theorem 3.1 (Theorem 2.4.2 in [63], see also [61]) Let G = (N,W) be a simple game. Then,
G is weighted if and only if G is trade robust.
This result is equivalent to the one given by Elgot [13] and Chow [8] in threshold logic. Instead
the notation of trade robustness, these authors used an equivalent condition of asummability of
vectors. If we are restricted to complete simple games and only allow pre-trades of shift-minimal
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winning coalitions, then we may refer to the property of invariant-trade robustness instead of
trade robustness and Theorem 3.1 can be reformulated in an equivalent way.
Theorem 3.2 (Theorem 4.7 in [17]) Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game. Then, G is
weighted if and only if G is invariant-trade robust.
As seen in Example 2.2 the trading transform 〈X1, X2|Y1, Y2〉 certifies a failure of 2-invariant-
trade robustness and therefore this complete simple game is not weighted. It is also trivial to see
that the simple game described in Example 2.1 is invariant-trade robust and therefore weighted.
Suppose G = (N,W) is a simple game. Then, G is said to be swap robust if a one–for–one
exchange between two winning coalitions can never render both losing. Thus, swap robustness
differs from trade robustness in two ways: the trades involve only two coalitions, and the exchanges
are one–for–one. That is to say, swap robustness considers m-trades of the following type: m = 2
and 〈X1, X2|X1 \ {a}, X2 ∪ {a}〉 with a ∈ X1 and a /∈ X2. It is fairly easy to generate simple
games that are not swap robust. The following theorem is a characterization of complete simple
games.
Theorem 3.3 (Proposition 3.2.6 in [63]) G is a complete simple game if and only if G is swap
robust.
Clearly, non–complete games are not 2-invariant trade robust. In fact, it is always possible
to find two shift-minimal winning coalitions which convert into losing coalitions after a one–for–
one exchange. Thus, the difficulty of the problem of determining when a given simple game is
weighted can be focused exclusively on the class of complete games. To obtain significant results
it is helpful to have a compact and manageable presentation of these games.
If, in a complete game, the number of the equivalence classes is lower than the number of
players, i.e., t < |N |, we have such a presentation. Indeed, Carreras and Freixas [6] provide a
classification theorem for complete simple games, here Theorem 4.2, that allows to enumerate all
these games up to isomorphism by listing the possible values of certain invariants. An advantage of
using the classification theorem is that it usually allows to work with a smaller number of vectors
than would be required with minimal winning coalitions. In the next section we introduce a
notion of trade-robustness based on these invariants.
As the basic game theoretic notions for simple games, we use in this paper, have already been
introduced, we list a list of language analogies between these notions to the fields of threshold
logic or Boolean algebra in next subsection. These analogies allow the easy translation of the
results from one field to the other. In particular, this list will be useful for scholars in threshold
logic to be aware of the new results we find in this paper and the questions and conjectures we
propose to be studied.
3.1 A list of analogies in the context of threshold logic
For the sake of simplicity, clarity, and for being coherent with the historical studies we write the
notions in the language of Boolean algebra (very similar to that of neural networks or threshold
logic). Tables 1 and 2 contain the main equivalences. The list is not exhaustive. Throughout the
rest of the paper we exclusively deal with simple games and refer to these two tables for direct
analogies of the results we find and the questions and conjectures we pose.
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Table 1: Variables and vectors versus players and coalitions.
variable or node player or voter
irrelevant variable null player
essential variable vetoer
vector coalition
true vector winning coalition
false vector losing coalition
minimal true vector minimal winning coalition
maximal false vector maximal losing coalition
shift-minimal true vector shift-minimal winning coalition
Table 2: Types of functions versus types of simple games.
switching function non-monotonic (simple) game
monotonic switching function (monotonic) simple game
threshold function weighted game
k-out-of-n switching function k-out-of-n simple game
regular function complete game
k-summable not k-trade robust
k-asummable k-trade robust
k-invariant summable not k-invariant trade robust
k-invariant asummable k-invariant trade robust
4 Symmetries and a parametrization of complete simple
games
For t < |N | types of voters we can represent coalitions in a more compact way. Let (N,W) be
a simple game and N1, . . . , Nt be a partition of the player set into t equivalence classes of voters
cf. Section 2. A coalition type (or coalition vector) is a vector s = (s1, . . . , st) ∈ (N ∪ {0})t with
0 ≤ si ≤ |Ni| for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. We say that a coalition S ⊆ N has type s if si = |S ∩ Ni|
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. A coalition type s is called winning if the coalitions of that type are winning.
Analogously, the notions of minimal winning, shift-minimal winning, losing, maximal losing and
shift-maximal losing are translated similarly for coalitional types. So, the simple game from
Example 2.1 can be described by the unique minimal winning coalition type (5, 4) which represents
all coalitions with 5 permanent members and 4 non-permanent members, and the simple game
from Example 2.2 can be described by the unique minimal winning coalition type (1, 6) which
represents all coalitions with 1 big province and 6 small provinces.
The notion of a trading transform for coalitions can be transferred to coalitional types for
vectors.
4.1 Coalitional types
Let G = (N,W) be a simple game and N1, . . . , Nt be a partition into t equivalence classes of
players. A vectorial trading transform for G is a sequence 〈x1, . . . , xj ; y1, . . . , yj〉 of coalition types
of even length such that
j∑
i=1
xi,k =
j∑
i=1
yi,k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t. (1)
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The definition of a vectorial trading transform means that for each component 1 ≤ k ≤ t, the
sum of the kth xs components coincides with the sum of the kth ys components.
A vectorial m-trade is a vectorial trading transform with j ≤ m such that the xis are winning
and after trades, as described in 1, convert into yis.
A given m-trade can easily be converted into a vectorial m-trade. The following lemma shows
that the converse is also true, i.e., each given vectorial m-trade can be converted into an m-trade.
Lemma 4.1 For each pair of vectors a = (a1, . . . , ar) ∈ N
r
>0, b = (b1, . . . , bs) ∈ N
s
>0 with∑r
i=1 ai =
∑s
i=1 bi and m = max (maxi ai,maxi bi) there exist two sequences of sets A1, . . . , Ar ⊆
{1, . . . ,m} and B1, . . . , Bs ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} with |Ai| = ai, |Bi| = bi and
|{i : j ∈ Ai}| = |{i : j ∈ Bi}|
for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof: W.l.o.g. we assume a1 ≥ · · · ≥ ar and b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bs. We prove the statement by induction
on σ =
∑r
i=1 ai. For σ = 1 we have r = s = a1 = b1 = m = 1 and can choose A1 = B1 = {1}.
We remark that the statement is also true for σ = 0, i.e., where r = s = 0.
If there exist indices i, j with ai = bj, then we can choose Ai = {1, . . . , ai}, Bj = {1, . . . , bj =
ai} and apply the induction hypothesis on (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , ar) and (b1, . . . , bj−1, bj+1, . . . , bs).
In the remaining cases we assume w.l.o.g. a1 = m and b1 < m. Now let l be the maximal
index with al = m. Since
∑r
i=1 ai =
∑s
i=1 bi we have s ≥ l. So, we can consider the reduction
to (a1− 1, . . . , al− 1, al+1, . . . , ar) and (b1− 1, . . . , bl− 1, bl+1, . . . , bs), where we possibly have to
remove some zero entries and the maximum entry decreases tom−1. Let A′1, . . . , A
′
r, B
′
1, . . . , B
′
s ⊆
{1, . . . ,m− 1} be suitable coalitions (allowing A′i = ∅ or B
′
i = ∅ for the ease of notation). Adding
player m to the first l coalitions in both cases yields the desired sequences of coalitions. 
The construction in Lemma 4.1 for each equivalence class of voters separately converts a
vectorial m-trade into an m-trade. Also for vectorial m-trades we may assume that the winning
coalition types are minimal winning or that the losing coalition types are maximal losing. Since the
number of coalition types is at most as large as the number of coalitions we can computationally
benefit from considering vectorialm-trades if the number of types of voters is less than the number
of voters.
4.2 A parametrization of complete simple games
In a complete simple game G = (N,W) we have a strict ordering between two voters of different
equivalence classes. This ordering entails a hierarchy among voters. Some studies on allowable
hierarchies can be found in [2, 20, 24]. As before, we denote by N1 > · · · > Nt the equivalence
classes which form the unique partition of N where a ≻ b for all a ∈ Ni and b ∈ Nj with i < j.
Let n = (n1, . . . , nt) where ni = |Ni| for all i = 1, . . . , t. Consider
Λ(n) = {s ∈ (N ∪ {0})t : n ≥ s},
where ≥ stands for the ordinary componentwise ordering, that is, a ≥ b if and only if ak ≥
bk for every k = 1, ..., t. and also consider the weaker ordering  given by comparison of partial
sums, that is,
a  b if and only if
k∑
i=1
ai ≥
k∑
i=1
bi for k = 1, .., t.
If a  b we say that a dominates b.
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The couple (Λ(n),) is a distributive lattice and possesses a maximum (respectively, mini-
mum) element, namely n = (n1, ..., nt) (resp. 0 = (0, ..., 0)). As abbreviations we use a ≻ b for
the cases where a  b but a 6= b and a ⊲⊳ b for the cases where neither a  b nor b  a.
The interpretation of a  b is as follows. If b is a winning coalitional vector and a  b, then
also a is winning. Similarly, if a is losing then b is losing too for all a  b.
A winning coalitional vector a such that b is losing for all a ≻ b is called shift-minimal winning.
Similarly, a losing coalition type b such that a is winning for all a ≻ b are called shift-maximal
losing. Each complete simple game can be uniquely described by either its set of shift-minimal
winning coalition types or its set of shift-maximal losing coalition types.
Based on this insight, Carreras and Freixas ([6] pp. 148-150) provided a classification theorem
for complete simple games that allow to enumerate all these games up to isomorphism by listing
the possible values of certain invariants. Indeed, to each complete simple game (N,W) one can
associate the vector n ∈ Nt as defined above and the list of shift-minimal winning coalitional
vectors: mp = (mp,1,mp,2, . . . ,mp,t) for 1 ≤ p ≤ r.
Recall that two simple games (N,W) and (N ′,W ′) are said to be isomorphic if there exists a
bijective map f : N → N ′ such that S ∈ W if only if f(S) ∈ W ′.
Theorem 4.2 (Theorem 4.1 in [6]) (a) Given a vector n ∈ Nt and a matrix M whose rows
mp = (mp,1,mp,2, . . . ,mp,t) for 1 ≤ p ≤ r satisfy the following properties:
(i) 0 ≤ mp ≤ n for 1 ≤ p ≤ r;
(ii) mp and mq are not –comparable if p 6= q; i.e., mp ⊲⊳ mq
(iii) if t = 1, then m1,1 > 0; if t > 1, then for every k < t there exists some p such that
mp,k > 0, mp,k+1 < nk+1;
and
(iv) M is lexicographically ordered by partial sums, if p < q either mp,1 > mq,1 or there exists
some k ≥ 1 such that mp,k > mq,k and mp,i = mq,i for h < k.
Then, there exists a complete simple game (N,W) associated to (n,M).
(Theorem 4.2 in [6]) (b) Two complete games (N,W) and (N ′,W ′) are isomorphic if and only if
n = n′ and M =M′.
The pair (n,M) is referred as the characteristic invariants of game (N,W). The authors
prove that these parameters determine the game in the sense that one is able to define a unique
up to isomorphism complete simple game which possesses these invariants. The characteristic
invariants allow us to count and generate all these games for small values of n. Other applications
of the characteristic invariants are to considerably reduce the calculus of some solutions, as values
or power indices, of the game (see e.g., [21] for the nucleolus [56]) or to study whether a game
admits a representation as a weighted game by studying the consistency of a system of inequalities
as we will see below.
If matrix M has only one row, i.e. a unique shift-minimal coalitional vector, then the char-
acteristic invariants reduce to the couple (n,m) with
1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1
1 ≤ mk ≤ nk − 1 if 2 ≤ k ≤ t− 1,
0 ≤ mt ≤ nt − 1,
where the first subindex in matrix M is omitted. It is said, see [21], that (n,m) is a complete
game with minimum.
We sketch here how to obtain the characteristic invariants (n,M) for the complete game from
winning coalitions and reciprocally.
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Given a simple game (N,W), for each coalition S we consider the vector or coalitional type
s = (|S ∩N1| , ..., |S ∩Nt|),
in Λ(n) where Ni are the equivalence classes with N1 > ... > Nt. The vector n is (|N1| , ..., |Nt|).
The rows of matrix M are those s such that any S is a shift-minimal winning coalition in the
lattice (Λ(n),). Observe that each vector of indices that –dominates a row ofM corresponds
to winning coalitions.
Conversely, given (n,M) the game (N,W) can be reconstructed, up to isomorphism, as fol-
lows. The cardinality of N is n =
∑t
i=1 ni, the elements of N are denoted by {1, 2, . . . , n}. The
equivalent classes of (N,W) are N1 = {1, . . . , n1}, N2 = {n1 + 1, . . . , n1 + n2}, and so on.
Each S ⊆ N with vector s = (|S ∩N1| , ..., |S ∩Nt|) is a winning coalition if s  m for some
m being a row of M. Hence, the set of winning coalitions is
W = {S ⊆ N : s  mp, where mp is a row ofM}.
Notice that a winning vector is a vector r such that the coalition representative R is winning.
In particular, the shift-minimal winning coalitions are those with a vector being a row of M.
Precisely,
Ws = {S ⊆ N : s = mp for some p = 1, . . . r}.
Analogously, one can define the coalitional types of shift–maximal losing coalitions which can be
written as rows in a matrix Y lexicographically ordered, as requested also for M, to preserve
uniqueness. These coalitional types are the maximal vectors which are not -comparable among
them and do not dominate by  any row of M.
Some particular forms of the pair (n,M) reveal the presence of players being either vetoers
or nulls. For instance, if mp,t = 0 for all p = 1, . . . , r the game has nt null players. If mp,1 = n1
for all p = 1, . . . , r the game has n1 vetoers.
Using the well known fact that any weighted game admits normalized representations, where
i ∼ j if and only if wi = wj , we will consider from now on, w = (w1, ..., wt), the vector of
weights to be assigned to the members of each of the t equivalence classes. Using normalized
representations a weighted game may be expressed as [q;w1(n1), . . . , wt(nt)] in which repetition
of weights is indicated within parentheses and q stands for the quota or threshold. However,
these parentheses will be omitted provided that n = (n1, . . . , nt) is a known vector. A complete
simple game, (N,W), is weighted if and only if there is a vector w = (w1, ..., wt), such that
w1 > ... > wt ≥ 0, which satisfies the system of inequalities
(mp − αq) · w > 0 for all p = 1, 2, ..., r, q = 1, . . . , s
where r is the number of rows of M, s the number of rows of Y, and αq are the rows of Y.
Only for n ≥ 6 there are complete simple games which are not weighted. The following
example is the smallest possible illustration of a complete simple game with minimum, i.e., with
one shift-minimal winning vector, that is not a weighted game. It helps us to understand better
this kind of games, which are extensively used in the next section.
Example 4.3 a. (Example 2.1 revisited) The characteristic invariants for this example are:
n = (5, 10) and M = (5 4). Thus,
W = {(5, x) ∈ Λ(5, 10) : x ≥ 4}
Wm =Ws = {(5, 4)}
Note also that Y =
(
5 3
4 10
)
whose rows are the shift-maximal coalitional types. As
shown, this game is weighted. In the next section we will show that to prove this it suffices
to verify k-invariant trade robustness, where k is 2.
10
b. (Example 2.2 revisited) The characteristic invariants for this example are: n = (2, 8) and
M = (1 6). Thus,
W = {(x, y) ∈ Λ(2, 8) : x ≥ 1 and x+ y ≥ 7}
Wm = {(2, 5), (1, 6)}
Ws = {(1, 6)}
Note also that Y =
(
2 4
0 8
)
whose rows are the shift-maximal coalitional types.
Note that Example 2.2 is not 2-invariant trade robust since the coalitional type trading
transform:
< (1, 6), (1, 6)|(2, 4), (0, 8) > is a certificate for it. Hence, the game is not weighted.
4.3 Two parameters for complete simple games
Two parameters for a complete simple game are significant for our studies: r the number of rows
of M or number of shift-minimal coalitional vectors and t the number of equivalence classes of
players in the game. The conditions that M must fulfill are described in Theorem 4.2. The
question we pose here is the following: Are there some values for r and t for which 2-invariant
trade robustness is conclusive? The purpose of Section 5 is to prove that the posed question has
an affirmative answer for either r = 1 (no matter the value of t) or t = 2 (no matter the value of
r), while in Section 6 we investigate the remaining cases.
Let us remark that the number of complete and weighted games as a function of |N | up
to isomorphisms has been determined for these two parameters. We use below the notations
cg(n, ⋆, r), cg(n, t, ⋆), wg(n, ⋆, r), and wg(n, t, ⋆) depending on whether we consider complete or
weighted games or parameter r or parameter t. The first (trivial) exact counting establishes the
number of k–out–of–n simple games. Each of such games admits [k; 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
] as a weighted
representation where k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. As t = 1 implies r = 1 we have cg(n, 1, ⋆) = wg(n, 1, ⋆) = n.
For r = 1, we have cg(n, ⋆, 1) = 2n − 1 (see [22]) complete simple games with minimum with
n players up to isomorphism and the number of weighted games with minimum, wg(n, ⋆, 1), is
given by
wg(n, ⋆, 1) =


2n − 1, if n ≤ 5
n4 − 6n3 + 23n2 − 18n+ 12
12
, if n ≥ 6
cf. [15].
For t = 2 we have the nice formula cg(n, 2, ⋆) = F (n+6)− (n2+4n+8) (cf. [19]) where F (n)
are the Fibonacci numbers which constitute a well–known sequence of integer numbers defined
by the following recurrence relation: F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1, and F (n) = F (n− 1)+F (n− 2) for all
n > 1. Quite curiously the addition of trivial voters, as null voters or vetoers, in complete games
with two equivalence classes formed by non-trivial voters give new larger Fibonacci sequences
(cf. [14]). Up to now there is not a known formula for wg(n, 2, ⋆) although it has been proved
in [16] that wg(n, 2, ⋆) ≤ n
5
15 + 4n
4.
Concerning general enumeration for simple, complete and weighted games it should be said
that in the successive works by Muroga et al. [46, 45, 47] the number of such games was determined
up to eight voters. Only the numbers of complete and weighted games for n = 9 voters have been
determined since then, cf. [18] for the number of complete games for n = 9 and cf. [36, 38] for the
number of weighted games for n = 9. An asymptotic upper bound for weighted games is given
in [10] and an asymptotic lower bound for complete games in [50].
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5 Cases for which the test of 2-invariant trade robustness
is conclusive
Note first that each simple game with a unique equivalence class of voters, t = 1, is anonymous
(symmetric), and thus weighted. Non-complete games are not swap robust and therefore they
are obviously not weighted. Hence, we can limit our study to complete simple games.
Prior to study them let us consider the null effect on invariant trade robustness of removing
either null or veto players in a given complete simple game. Since adding and removing null
players does not change a coalition from winning to losing or the other way round, we can state:
Lemma 5.1 Let G be a complete simple game and G′ be the game arising from G by removing its
null players. With this we have that G is m-invariant trade robust if and only if G′ is m-invariant
trade robust.
And a similar result, not as immediate, concerns veto players.
Lemma 5.2 Let G be a complete simple game and G′ be the game arising from G by removing
its veto players. If G′ is a simple game, then G is m-invariant trade robust if and only if G′ is
m-invariant trade robust.
Proof: If veto players are present, then each winning coalition of a simple game must contain
all veto players. So, in any m-trade every involved losing coalition must also contain all veto
players. Let G = (N,W) be a simple game, where ∅ 6= V ⊆ N is the set of veto players. If
V = N the game G is the unanimity game and therefore weighted. Otherwise we can consider
G′ = (N ′,W ′), where N ′ = N\V and N ′ ⊇ S ∈ W ′ if and only if S ∪ V ∈ W . If ∅ ∈ W ′, then
the players in N\V are nulls in G′ and the game is indeed weighted. Otherwise G′ is a simple
game too. If G is complete, then G′ is complete too, see e.g. [14]. Given an m-trade for G′, we
can obtain an m-trade for G by adding V to all coalitions. For the other direction removing all
veto players turns an m-trade for G into an m-trade for G′. 
5.1 The 2-invariant characterization for r = 1
Theorem 5.3 Each complete simple game G with r = 1 shift-minimal winning coalition type is
either weighted or not 2-invariant trade robust.
Proof: Due to Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2 we can assume that G contains neither nulls nor vetoers,
since also the number of shift-minimal winning coalition types is preserved by the transformations
used in the respective proofs.
For t ≥ 3 types of players let the invariants of G be given by n = (n1, . . . , nt) and M =(
m1 . . . mt
)
, where we abbreviate the unique shift-minimal winning coalitional vector by m.
From the conditions of the general parametrization theorem in [6] we conclude 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1,
0 ≤ mt ≤ nt − 1, and 1 ≤ mi ≤ ni − 1 for all 1 < i < t. If m1 = n1 then G contains veto
players and if mt = 0 then G contains null players (cf. [14]). So, we have 1 ≤ mi ≤ ni − 1 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ t in our situation. We can easily check that a = (m1 − 1,m2 + 1,m3 + 1,m4, . . . ,mt)
and b = (m1 + 1,m2 − 1,m3 − 1,m4, . . . ,mt) are losing. Thus, < m,m; a, b > is a 2-trade and G
is not 2-invariant trade robust.
For t = 2 types of players let the invariants of G be given by n = (n1, n2) andM =
(
m1 m2
)
,
where again we abbreviate the unique shift-minimal winning coalitional vector by m. From
the conditions of the general parametrization theorem in [6] we conclude 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1 and
0 ≤ m2 ≤ n2 − 1. If m1 = n1 then G contains veto players and if mt = 0 then G contains null
players. So, we have 1 ≤ mi ≤ ni − 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 in our situation.
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If 2 ≤ m2 ≤ n2 − 2, then a = (m1 − 1,m2 + 2) and b = (m1 + 1,m2 − 2) are losing. Thus,
< m,m; a, b > is a 2-trade and G is not 2-invariant trade robust.
If m2 = 1 or m2 = n2 − 1, then both games are weighted.
Indeed, if m2 = 1, then Y =
(
m1 0
m1 − 1 n2
)
, and the weights (w1, w2) = (n2, 1) may be
assigned to players in each class respectively, so that a quota of m1 · w1 + w2 = m1 · n2 + 1
separates weights of winning and losing coalition types.
If m2 = n2 − 1, then Y =
(
c1 c2
m1 − 1 n2
)
where c1 = min(n1,m1 + n2 − 2) and c2 =
max(m1 + n2 − 2− n1, 0).
Now, we have two subcases to consider:
If c1 = n1 a solution is (w1, w2) = (n1 −m1 + 2, n1−m1 + 1) with quota q = m1 ·w1 + (n2 −
1) · w2 = m1 · (n1 −m1 + 2) + (n2 − 1) · (n1 −m1 + 1).
If c1 = m1 + n2 − 2 then c2 = 0 and a solution is (w1, w2) = (n2, n2 − 1) with quota
q = m1 · w1 + (n2 − 1) · w2 = m1 · n2 + (n2 − 1)2. 
So, complete simple games with r = 1 have the property that they are either weighted or not
2-invariant trade robust. Now we are going to see that this characterization is also true for t = 2.
5.2 The 2-invariant characterization for t = 2
Freixas and Molinero [17] prove that there is a sequence of complete simple games Gm with three
types of equivalent voters, i.e., t = 3, and three types of shift-minimal winning types, i.e., r = 3,
such that Gm is m-invariant trade but not (m+1)-invariant trade robust for each positive integer
m. Moreover, they state in Conjecture 6.1 of their paper that any complete game with t = 2 types
of equally desirable voters is either weighted or not 2-invariant trade robust. In this subsection
we prove this conjecture. Prior to stating the result let us introduce some characterizations for
weightedness that will be used in the sequel. The definition of a weighted game can be rewritten
to a quota-free variant:
Lemma 5.4 Let G = (N,W) be a simple game. Then,
G is weighted ⇐⇒ there are n nonnegative integers w1, . . . , wn such that∑
i∈S
wi >
∑
i∈T
wi (2)
for all S ∈ W and all T ∈ L.
Moreover, we can use a single weight for equivalent players, i.e., a common weight wi for each
voter p ∈ Ni where Ni is an equivalence class of players according to the desirability relation. If
the game is complete we have a total order among the equivalence classes, N1 > · · · > Nt. Assume
from now on t = 2 so that N1 6= ∅ and N2 6= ∅ is a partition of N . By Wv we denote the set
of winning coalition types and by Lv the set of losing coalition types. For instance, (x, y) ∈ Wv
means that all coalition S ⊆ N such that |S ∩N1| = x and |S ∩N2| = y is winning. With this,
Lemma 5.4 can be rewritten to:
Lemma 5.5 Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game with two types of voters. Then,
G is weighted ⇐⇒ there are two integers w1, w2 ≥ 0 such that
[(x, y)− (x′, y′)] · (w1, w2) > 0 (3)
for all (x, y) ∈ Wv and all (x′, y′) ∈ Lv and “·” stands here for the inner product.
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For the proof of the theorem for t = 2 two special parameters of a complete simple game will
play a key role so that we give even another reformulation of Lemma 5.4:
Lemma 5.6 Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game with two types of voters. Then,
G is weighted ⇐⇒ there are two integers w1, w2 ≥ 0 such that
w2 > Mw1 and w1 > Pw2, (4)
where
M = max
(x,y)∈Wv, (x′,y′)∈Lv :x′≥x
x′ − x
y − y′
and
P = max
(x,y)∈Wv, (x′,y′)∈Lv :x′<x
y′ − y
x− x′
fulfill 0 ≤M < 1 and P ≥ 1.
Proof: Let (x, y) ∈ Wv and (x′, y′) ∈ Lv. If x′ ≥ x, then x+y > x′+y′, so that y−y′ > x′−x ≥ 0.
Thus, M is well defined and we have 0 ≤M < 1. Also P is well defined, since we assume x′ < x
in its definition. For r = 2 in matrix M in Theorem 4.2 we conclude the existence of a shift-
minimal winning type (a, b) with a > 0 and b < |N2|, i.e., (a− 1, b+ 1) is losing. Thus, we have
P ≥ (b+1)−b
a−(a−1) = 1.
It remains to remark that all inequalities of the definition of a weighted game are implied by
the ones in (4). 
Corollary 5.7 Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game with two types of voters. Using the
notation from Lemma 5.6, we have
G is weighted ⇐⇒ M P < 1. (5)
We still need an additional technical trivial lemma.
Lemma 5.8 Let s, u ∈ R≥0 and t, v ∈ R>0. If t > v and
s
t
≥ u
v
, then we have s−u
t−v
≥ s
t
.
Let us finally prove the result of this subsection, which was previously stated as Conjecture
6.1 in [17, page 1507].
Theorem 5.9 Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game with two types of voters. Then, G is
weighted if and only if G is 2-invariant trade robust.
Proof: The direct part is immediate since G being weighted implies G satisfies m-invariant trade
robustness for all m > 1. For the other part we start by proving that if G is a complete simple
game with t = 2 types of voters and G is 2-invariant trade robust, then it is 2-trade robust.
Let 〈(a1, b1), (a2, b2); (u1, v1), (u2, v2)〉 be a 2-trade of G such that (a1, b1) and (a2, b2) are
minimal winning. If both coalition types are shift-minimal, we have finished. In the remaining
cases we construct a 2-trade with one shift-minimal winning coalition type more than before.
W.l.o.g. we assume that (a1, b1) is not shift-minimal, so that we consider the shift to (a1−1, b1+1).
If u1 ≥ 1 and v1 ≤ n2−1 then we can replace (u1, v1) by the losing coalitional vector (u1−1, v1+1).
By symmetry the same is true for (u2, v2). Thus, for the cases, where we can not shift one of the
losing vectors, we have
(u1 = 0 ∨ v1 = n2) ∧ (u2 = 0 ∨ v2 = n2) .
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(1) u1 = 0, u2 = 0:
Since u1 + u2 = a1 + a2 we have a1 = a2 = 0. Since (0, b1), (0, b2) are winning and (0, v1),
(0, v2) are losing, we have min(b1, b2) > max(v1, v2), which contradicts b1 + b2 = v1 + v2.
(2) v1 = n2, v2 = n2:
Since b1+b2 = v1+v2 we have b1 = b2 = n2. Since (a1, n2), (a2, n2) are winning and (u1, n2),
(u2, n2) are losing, we have min(a1, a2) > max(u1, u2), which contradicts a1+a2 = u1+u2.
(3) u1 = 0, v2 = n:
Since u1+u2 = a1+ a2 we have a2 ≤ u2. Comparing the winning coalitional vector (a2, b2)
with the losing vector (u2, n2), yields b2 > n2, which is not possible.
(4) u2 = 0, v1 = n:
Similar to case (3).
Thus, a shift of one of the losing vectors is always possible, if not both winning vectors are
shift-minimal.
According to Theorem 3.1 it remains to prove that for t = 2 it is not possible for G to be
2-trade robust but not weighted.
Let (a, b) and (a′, b′) be two winning vectors, (c, d) and (c′, d′) be two losing vectors such that
M =
c− a
b − d
and P =
d′ − b′
a′ − c′
, (6)
where we assume that the vectors are chosen in such a way that both c − a and d′ − b′ are
minimized. We remark a′− c′ > 0, d′− b′ > 0, b− d > 0 and c− a ≥ 0. The latter inequality can
be strengthened to c− a > 0, since c− a implies M = 0 and MP < 1, which is a contradiction
to the non-weightedness of G.
Corollary 5.7 implies MP ≥ 1, so that
c− a
b− d
≥
a′ − c′
d′ − b′
. (7)
With this, we have only the following three cases:
(a) c− a ≥ a′ − c′ and b− d ≤ d′ − b′.
(b) c− a > a′ − c′ and b− d > d′ − b′.
(c) c− a < a′ − c′.
If c− a = a′ − c′ then we have b− d ≤ d′ − b′ according to Inequality (7), i.e., we are in case (a).
If c− a > a′ − c′ then either case (a) or case (b) applies. The remaining cases are summarized in
(c).
(a) Since c + c′ ≥ a + a′ and d + d′ ≥ b + b′, we can delete convenient units of some coordi-
nates of (c, d) and (c′, d′) to obtain two well-defined losing vectors satisfying (c′′, d′′) ≤
(c, d) and (c′′′, d′′′) ≤ (c′, d′) with c′′ + c′′′ = a + a′ and d′′ + d′′′ = b + b′. Thus,
〈(a, b), (a′, b′); (c′′, d′′), (c′′′, d′′′)〉 certifies a failure of 2-trade robustness.
(b) Consider (c′′, d′′) = (a + a′ − c′, b + b′ − d′). Since a′ − c′ > 0 and c− a > a′ − c′ we have
a < c′′ < c. Since b − d > d′ − b′ and d′ − b′ > 0 we have d < d′′ < b. Thus, (c′′, d′′) is a
well-defined coalition type. Assuming that (c′′, d′′) is winning, we obtain
c− c′′
d′′ − d
=
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
c− a− (
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
a′ − c′)
b− d︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− (d′ − b′︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
Lemma 5.8
≥
c− a
b− d
=M,
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using b− d > d′− b′ and Inequality (7). Since c− c′′ < c− a we have either a contradiction
to the maximality of M or the minimality of c − a. Thus, (c′′, d′′) has to be losing and
〈(a, b), (a′, b′); (c′, d′), (c′′, d′′)〉 certifies a failure of 2-trade robustness.
(c) With c−a < a′− c′ Inequality (7) implies d′− b′ > b−d. Consider (a′′, b′′) = (c+ c′−a, d+
d′ − b). Since c− a > 0 and c− a < a′ − c′ we have c′ < a′′ < a′. Since d′ − b′ > b− d and
b − d > 0 we have b′ < b′′ < d′. Thus, (a′′, b′′) is a well-defined coalition type. Assuming
that (a′′, b′′) is losing, we obtain
b′′ − b′
a′ − a′′
=
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
d′ − b′ − (
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
b− d)
a′ − c′︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− (c− a︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
Lemma 5.8
≥
d′ − b′
a′ − c′
= P
using c−a < a′−c′ and Inequality (7). Since b′′−b′ < d′−b′ we have either a contradiction
to the maximality of P or the minimality of d′ − b′. Thus, (a′′, b′′) has to be winning and
〈(a, b), (a′′, b′′); (c, d), (c′, d′)〉 certifies a failure of 2-trade robustness.

Let us have a look at Example 2.2 again. We have already observed that this game is
not weighted. Nevertheless it can be represented as the intersection [7; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]∩
[12; 6, 6, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1], i.e., there are only two types of provinces – the large ones, Ontario
and Quebec, and the small ones, see [19]. Indeed the game is complete and the minimal winning
vectors are given by (2, 5) and (1, 6). The maximal losing vectors are given by (2, 4), (1, 5), and
(0, 8), so that we have M = 12 and P = 3. These values are uniquely attained by the coalition
types (1, 6), (2, 5) and (2, 4), (0, 8). Thus we are in case (c) of the proof of Theorem 5.9 and de-
termine the winning coalitional vector (a′′, b′′) = (1, 6). Indeed, 〈(1, 6), (1, 6)|(2, 4), (0, 8)〉 certifies
a failure of 2-trade robustness. We remark that our previous argument for non-weightedness was
exactly of this form and that the coalition type (1, 6) is shift-minimal. Let us finally conclude this
subsection by recalling that Theorem 5.9 establishes that a complete game is weighted if and only
it is 2-invariant trade robust. Checking that property requires fewer computations than 2-trade
robustness, which was proved in [31] to be sufficient for testing weightedness.
6 Further invariant trade characterizations
We have seen in the previous section that complete simple games with t = 2 or r = 1 have the
property that they are either weighted or not 2-invariant trade robust.
For other combinations of r and t it is interesting to ascertain which is the maximum integer
m such that m-invariant trade robustness for the given game with parameters r and t guarantees
that it is weighted. Note first that t = 1 implies r = 1 so that the pairs (r, t) = (r, 1) for r > 1
are not feasible. The results in the previous section allow us to conclude that for (r, t) = (1, t)
with t arbitrary or for (r, t) = (r, 2) with r arbitrary such an m is given by 2.
The existence of a sequence of complete games being m-invariant trade robust but not (m+1)-
invariant trade robust is proven for m ≥ 4 by using complete games with parameters (r, t) =
(3, 3) in [17]. This sequence of games is uniquely characterized by n = (2,m,m − 1) and M =
 2 0 11 0 m− 1
0 m m− 2

. We wonder what is happening for the remaining cases of the parameters r
and t.
Consider first the smallest case: (r, t) = (2, 3).
16
Lemma 6.1 For m ≥ 3 the sequence of complete simple games uniquely characterized by n =
(2,m,m) andM =
(
2 0 1
1 1 m− 1
)
is (m−1)-invariant trade robust but not m-invariant trade
robust.
Proof: For brevity we set w1 = (2, 0, 1) and w2 = (1, 1,m − 1). The maximal losing coalition
types are given by l1 = (2, 0, 0), l2 = (1, 0,m), l3 = (1, 1,m − 2), and l4 = (0,m,m). Since
m · w2 = 1 · l1 + (m− 2) · l2 + 1 · l4, the game is not m-invariant trade robust.
Now assume that there are non-negative integers a, b, c, d, e, f with a+ b = d+ e+ f > 0 and
a · w1 + b · w2 ≤ c · l1 + d · l2 + e · l3 + f · l4.
We conclude
2a+ b ≤ 2c+ d+ e, (8)
b ≤ e+m · f, and (9)
a+ (m− 1) · b ≤ (m− 1) · (d+ e+ f). (10)
Assuming f = 0, we conclude b ≤ e from Inequality (9), so that we have a ≥ c + d due to
a + b = d + e + f . Inequality (8) then yields a = c, b = e, and d = 0. By inserting this into
Inequality (10), we conclude c = e = 0, which contradicts d+ e+ f > 0. Thus, we have f ≥ 1.
Inequality (8) yields c ≥ a + f ≥ 1. Assuming b ≤ d + e + f we conclude a ≥ c from
a+b = d+e+f , which is a contradiction to c ≥ a+f and f ≥ 1. Thus, we have b ≥ d+e+f+1.
Inequality (10) yields
d+ f − e
m− 1
− a ≥ 1, (11)
so that d+ f ≥ m− 1. Since c ≥ 1, we have c+ d+ e+ f ≥ m, i.e., the game is m− 1-invariant
trade robust. 
We remark that the smallest complete simple game with t = 3, r = 2 being 3-invariant trade
robust, but not 4-invariant trade robust, is given by n = (2, 2, 3) and M =
(
2 1 0
1 0 3
)
, as
already observed in [17]. A certificate for a failure of 4-invariant trade robustness is given by
〈w1, w1, w2, w2; l1, l1, l1, l2〉, where w1 = (2, 1, 0), w2 = (1, 0, 3), l1 = (2, 0, 1), and l2 = (0, 2, 3).
The smallest complete simple game with t = 3, r = 2 being 4-invariant trade robust, but not
5-invariant trade robust, is attained by Lemma 6.1 for m = 5.
Lemma 6.2 For m ≥ 3 the sequence of complete simple games uniquely characterized by n =
(2,m,m) and M =


2 1 0
2 0 2
1 0 m
0 m m− 1

 is m-invariant trade robust but not (m + 1)-invariant
trade robust.
Proof: For brevity we set w1 = (2, 1, 0), w2 = (2, 0, 2), w3 = (1, 0,m), and w4 = (0,m,m − 1).
The maximal losing coalition types are given by l1 = (2, 0, 1), l2 = (1, 0,m− 1), l3 = (1, 1,m− 3),
l4 = (0,m,m− 2), and l5 = (0,m− 1,m). Since (m− 1) ·w1 + 2 ·w3 = m · l1 +1 · l5, the game is
not (m+ 1)-invariant trade robust.
Now assume that there are non-negative integers a1, a2, a3, a4, b1, b2, b3, b4, and b5 with
∑4
i=1 ai =∑5
i=1 bi > 0 and
k =
4∑
i=1
ai · wi ≤
5∑
i=1
bi · li. (12)
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It suffices to consider the cases where k ≤ m. We conclude
2a1 + 2a2 + a3 ≤ 2b1 + b2 + b3, (13)
a1 + ma4 ≤ b3 + m(b4 + b5)− b5, and (14)
2a2 + ma3 + (m− 1)a4 ≤ b1 + (m− 1)(
5∑
i=2
bi)− 2b3 − b4 + b5. (15)
Let us first assume a4 = 0. Using Inequality (12) and Inequality (13) we obtain
a3 ≥ b2 + b3 + 2b4 + 2b5. (16)
Inserting this into Inequality (15) yields after rearranging
2a2 + b2 + 3b3 + (m+ 2)b4 +mb5 ≤ b1. (17)
Since k ≤ m, we have b4 = b5 = 0. (For k = m+1 we have the solution b1 = m, b2 = b3 = b4 = 0,
b5 = 1, a1 = m − 1, a3 = 2, and a2 = a4 = 0.) With this, Inequality (14) simplifies to b3 ≥ a1
and Inequality (15) simplifies to b1 + (m − 1)b2 + (m − 3)b3 ≥ 2a2 +ma3. Twice the first plus
the second inequality gives
b1 + (m− 1)b2 + (m− 1)b3 ≥ 2a1 + 2a2 +ma3. (18)
Inserting Inequality (12) yields
− b1 + (m− 3)(b2 + b3) ≥ (m− 3)a3 + a3. (19)
Using Inequality (16) we conclude a3 = b1 = 0. Using Inequality (16) again, we conclude
b2 = b3 = 0, which is a contradiction to k = b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 + b5 > 0. Thus, we have a4 ≥ 1 in
all cases.
2m − 2 times Inequality (13) plus twice Inequality (14) plus Inequality (15) minus 3m − 2
times Inequality (12) yields
ma1 +ma2 + b2 + b3 + a4 ≤ (m− 1)b1.
Since a4 ≥ 1 and b1 ∈ Z≥0, we have b1 ≥ 1.
3m − 4 times Inequality (13) plus 4 times Inequality (14) plus twice Inequality (15) minus
6m− 4 times Inequality (12) yields
ma3 ≥ 2a4 + 2b1 + (m− 2)b2 + (m− 2)b3.
Since a4, b1 ≥ 1 and a3 ∈ Z≥0, we have a3 ≥ 1.
m − 32 times Inequality (13) plus Inequality (14) plus Inequality (15) minus 2m − 2 times
Inequality (12) yields
a2 +
a3
2
+ a4 ≤ −
b2
2
−
3b3
2
+ b5. (20)
Since a3, b4 ≥ 1 and b5 ∈ Z≥0, we have b5 ≥ 2.
k = a1 + a2 + a3 + a4 ≤ m plus m times Inequality (13) plus Inequality (15) minus 2m+ 1
times Inequality (12) yields
2a2 − (m+ 1)a4 ≤ −2b2 − 4b3 − (m+ 3)b4 − (m+ 1)b5 +m. (21)
Since b5 ≥ 2 and a4 ∈ Z≥0, we have a4 ≥ 2.
From Inequality (20) and a2, b2, b3 ≥ 0 we conclude b5 ≥
a3
2 + a4, so that b5 ≥ a4 + 1 due
to a3 ≥ 1 and b5 ∈ Z≥0. From Inequality (21) and a2, b2, b3, b4 ≥ 0 we conclude (m + 1)a4 ≥
(m+ 1)b5 −m. Inserting b5 ≥ a4 + 1 finally yields the contradiction (m+ 1)a4 ≥ (m+ 1)a4 + 1.

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We remark that the proof of Lemma 6.2 looks rather technical and complicated at first sight.
However, the underlying idea is very simple. We have to show that the parametric ILP given by
inequalities (12)-(15) and 9 non-negative integer variables a1, . . . , a4, b1, . . . , b5 has a minimum
value of m+1 for the target function a1+ a2+ a3+ a4. By relaxing the integrality conditions we
obtain a corresponding linear program. Minimizing a suitable variable yields a fractional lower
bound that can be rounded up. The corresponding dual multipliers are used to conclude the
respective lower bounds directly.
Conjecture 6.3 For each r ≥ 5, i.e. at least 5 coalitional types of shift-minimal winning coali-
tions, there exists a sequence (Grm)m≥3 of complete simple games, such that G
r
m is m-invariant
trade robust but not (m+ 1)-invariant trade robust.
Lemma 6.4 Let G = (n,M) be a complete simple game with t types of voters and r shift-minimal
winning coalition types, being m-invariant trade robust, but not (m + 1)-invariant trade robust
for some m > 1. Then, there exists a complete simple game G′ with t + 1 types of voters and r
shift-minimal winning coalition types, which is m-invariant trade robust, but not (m+1)-invariant
trade robust.
Proof: Let m˜1, . . . , m˜r denote the rows ofM. If G contains nulls, i.e., if m˜it = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
we set m̂ij = m˜
i
j , m̂
i
t = 1, m̂
i
t+1 = 0, n̂j = nj , n̂t = 2, and n̂t+1 = nt for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t − 1,
1 ≤ i ≤ r. Otherwise we set m̂ij = m˜
i
j , m̂
i
t = 1, n̂j = nj , and n̂t+1 = 2 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
With this, we choose G′ = (n̂,M′), whereM′ is composed of the r rows m̂1, . . . , m̂r. We can
easily check that G′ is indeed weighted. Let l = (l1, . . . , lt+1) be a losing coalitional vector in G
′. If
G contains no nulls, then (l1, . . . , lt) is a losing vector in G. Otherwise, (l1, . . . , lt−1, lt+1) is a losing
coalitional vector in G. Thus, a possible certificate for the failure of m-invariant trade robustness
for G′ could be converted into a certificate for the failure of m-invariant trade robustness for G
by deleting the (t− 1)th or tth column of the corresponding vectors – a contradiction. Similarly,
we can convert a certificate for the failure of (m + 1)-invariant trade robustness for G into a
certificate for the failure of (m + 1)-invariant trade robustness for G′ by inserting ones into the
(t− 1)th or tth column of the corresponding vectors. 
The same proof is literally valid in the case of trade robustness:
Lemma 6.5 Let G = (n,M) be a complete simple game with t types of voters and r shift-minimal
winning coalition types, being m-trade robust, but not (m+1)-trade robust for some m > 1. Then,
there exists a complete simple game G′ with t + 1 types of voters and r shift-minimal winning
coalition types, which is m-trade robust, but not (m+ 1)-trade robust.
With these results at hand we may prove that larger classes of games according to parameters
r and t never reduce the largest failures of invariant-trade robustness. Table 3 summarizes the
invariant trade robust test to be used for a game to determine whether this is weighted. Looking
at this table we conclude that 2-invariant trade robustness is conclusive exactly for the cases
determined in Section 5 (conjectured values are printed in bold face), while for others there is no
combination of r and t for which some m > 2 be enough to ensure that the game is weighted.
In words, if one wishes to study the class of complete games with a given pair (r, t) then
2-invariant trade robustness is a very powerful tool to check weightedness for t ≤ 2 and r = 1,
but for the rest of combinations (r, t) we need to look at trade-robustness, which is the purpose
of the next section.
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Table 3: W: weighted; −: not possible; 2-I-T-R: either weighted or not 2-invariant trade robust;
∞-I-T-R: there are games being not m-invariant trade robust for all m; NW: not a weighted
game; conjectured values in bold face.
r ↓ | t→ 1 2 3 4 . . .
1 W 2-I-T-R 2-I-T-R 2-I-T-R NW
2 - 2-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R
3 - 2-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R
4 - 2-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R
. . . - 2-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R ∞-I-T-R
7 Further trade characterizations
It is well known that all simple games with up to 3 voters are weighted while there are non-
weighted simple games for n ≥ 4 voters. Restricting the class of simple games to swap robust
simple games, i.e. complete simple games, one can state that up to 5 voters each such game
is weighted while for n ≥ 6 voters there are non-weighted complete simple games. Going over
to 2-invariant trade robustness does not help too much. As shown in [17], precisely 3 of the
60 non-weighted complete simple games with n = 6 voters are 2-invariant trade robust but not
3-invariant trade robust. For the classical trade robustness the same authors have shown that all
2-trade robust complete simple games with up to seven voters are weighted. By an exhaustive
enumeration we have shown that the same statement is true for n = 8 voters, i.e., there are
exactly 2 730 164 weighted games and the remaining 13 445 024 complete simple games are not
2-trade robust. As shown in [27], there are complete simple games with n = 9 voters, which are
3-trade robust but not 4-trade robust. The corresponding example, belonging to a parametric
family, consists of nine different types of players, i.e., no two players are equivalent.
If the number t of types of players is restricted we can obtain tighter weighted characteriza-
tions. For t = 1 the games are always weighted and for t = 2 weightedness is equivalent with
2-trade robustness (or 2-invariant trade robustness for complete simple games). Based on this
characterization one can computationally determine the number of complete simple games with
two types of voters which are either weighted, i.e. 2-invariant trade robust, or not weighted, i.e.
not 2-invariant trade robust. In [19] this calculation was executed for n ≤ 40 voters. It turns out
that the fraction of non 2-invariant trade robust complete simple games quickly tends to 1. An
exact, easy-to-evaluate, and exponentially growing formula for the number of complete simple
games with two types of voters is proven in [19, 41]. From the upper bound n5/15 + 4n4, see
[16], for the number of weighted games with two types of voters, we can conclude that this is
generally true. We remark that it is not too hard to compute the number of 2-invariant trade
robust complete simple games with t = 2 for n ≤ 200, see [14], so that we abstain from giving a
larger table.
For t = 3 types of voters we have checked by an exhaustive enumeration that up to n = 10
voters each complete simple game is either weighted or not 2-trade robust. For n = 11 voters
we have the four examples given by n = (3, 3, 5), M1 =
(
2 2 3
1 2 5
)
, M2 =
(
1 1 2
0 1 4
)
, M3 =

3 3 0
3 0 4
2 3 2
0 3 5

, and M4 =


3 0 0
2 0 2
0 3 1
0 0 5

, which are all 2-trade robust but not 3-trade robust. This
resolves an open problem from [17]. We have computationally checked all complete simple games
with three types of voters, i.e. t = 3, and up to 15 voters, i.e. |N | ≤ 15, see Table 7. It seems
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Table 4: Classification of complete simple games with three types of up to 15 voters. Parameters:
size (n), number of complete simple games (#CG), number of weighted simple games (#WG),
number of non 2-trade robust complete simple games (#N-2T ), number of non 3-trade, but
2-trade, robust complete simple games (#N-3T ).
n #CG #WG #N-2T #N-3T
3 0 0 0 0
4 6 6 0 0
5 50 50 0 0
6 262 256 6 0
7 1114 976 138 0
8 4278 3112 1166 0
9 15769 8710 7059 0
10 58147 22084 36063 0
11 221089 51665 169420 4
12 886411 113211 773186 14
13 3806475 234649 3571788 38
14 17681979 463872 17218019 88
15 89337562 879989 88457385 188
16 492188528 1610011 490578137 380
17 2959459154 2852050 2956606348 756
that the number of games which are 2-trade robust but not 3-trade robust grows rather slowly.
Indeed, up to 15 players every 3-trade robust such game is weighted.
For t = 4 types and n = 9 voters there are several complete simple games which are 2-trade
robust but not 3-trade robust, e.g. the one given by n = (1, 2, 3, 3) and M =


1 0 1 0
0 2 0 1
0 1 2 0
0 1 1 2
0 0 3 2

.
For t = 4 and n = 10 there are already 120 complete simple games which are 2-trade robust but
not 3-trade robust.
The next cases to look at, are t = 3 and r = 2. For both cases we have already presented
examples which are 2-trade robust but not 3-trade robust.
In the next section we state a conjecture and ask for several questions related to the problem
in relation with the two parameters r and t of a complete game.
8 Open problems
Still we found no example which is 3-trade robust but not 4-trade robust.
Question 8.1 Is every 3-trade robust complete simple game with t = 3 types of voters weighted?
Question 8.2 Is every 3-trade robust complete simple game with r = 2 shift-minimal winning
coalition types weighted?
As a first step into the direction of these two questions, we have looked at the intersection
of both classes, i.e., complete simple games with t = 3 and r = 2. The game corresponding to
the previously presented matrices M1 and M2 for n = 11 voters are of this type and can be
generalized:
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Lemma 8.3 For each k1, k2, k3, l ∈ N the games uniquely characterized by n1 = (n1, n2, n3),
M1 =
(
n1 − (l + 1) n2 − 1 n3 − (l + 2)
n1 − 2(l + 1) n2 − 1 n3
)
, where n1 = 3+k1+2l, n2 = 3+k2, n3 = 5+k3+2l,
and n2 = (n1, n2, 5 + 2l), M2 =
(
l+ 1 1 l + 2
0 1 2(l + 2)
)
are 2-trade robust but not 3-trade robust.
We skip the easy but somewhat technical and lengthy proof. Having the nice parametrization
at hand, we can easily state the corresponding generating function, whose coefficients in the
resulting power series serve to count the number of those games.
x11
(
1
(1− x)3(1 − x4)
+
1
(1− x)2(1− x4)
)
=
x11(x− 2)
(1− x)3(1 − x4)
counting the number of such examples, i.e., asymptotically there are n
3
24 +O(n
2) such games.
Conjecture 8.4 All 3-trade robust complete simple games with t = 3 and r = 2 are weighted.
Additionally, the 2-trade robust but not 3-trade robust games are exactly those from Lemma 8.3.
By an exhaustive enumeration we have checked Conjecture 8.4 up to n = 20 voters. From the
previous results it is not clear whether a small number of types or shift-minimal winning coalition
types allows to restrict the check of m-trade robustness to a finite m.
Question 8.5 For which values of t does a sequence Gk of complete simple games with t types
of voters exist such that Gk is k-trade robust but not (k + 1)-trade robust for all k ≥ 2?
Question 8.6 For which values of r does a sequence Gk of complete simple games with r shift-
minimal winning coalition types exist such that Gk is k-trade robust but not (k + 1)-trade robust
for all k ≥ 2?
Any progress concerning answers for either the conjecture or the questions posed would be
of interest. In Table 5 we combine the results from Section 5 with the questions of this section.
For r = 2 or t = 3 we have not found any example being 3-trade robust but not weighted, but
this should be checked formally and become conjectures for future work (in Table 5 it appears in
black).
Table 5: W: weighted; −: not possible; 2-I-T-R: either weighted or not 2-invariant trade robust; 3-
T-R for small values of n all games are either weighted or not 3-trade robust – still a conjecture;
NW: not a weighted game; ?: it is not known if some m > 2 suffices to assert that m-trade
robustness implies weighted.
r ↓ | t→ 1 2 3 4 . . .
1 W 2-I-T-R 2-I-T-R 2-I-T-R NW
2 - 2-I-T-R 3-T-R 3-T-R 3-T-R
3 - 2-I-T-R 3-T-R ? ?
4 - 2-I-T-R 3-T-R ? ?
. . . - 2-I-T-R 3-T-R ? ?
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9 Conclusion
This paper looks at the characterization of threshold functions within the class of switching
functions. We have tried to gather results and efforts that have taken place in different areas of
study. The new results presented in this paper have been exposed in the simple game terminology
since some significant advances have been held in this area in the last two decades. To study
the main problem we have restricted ourselves to the class of complete games since non-complete
games are not swap-robust and therefore not weighted.
For complete games the test of trade robustness can be computationally relaxed to invariant
trade robustness. The strongest condition for invariant trade robustness, 2-invariant trade ro-
bustness, is conclusive for deciding if a given complete game is weighted if the complete game
has either a unique coalitional type of shift-minimal winning coalitions or two types of equivalent
voters. Larger values for the number of shift-minimal winning coalitions or for the number of
equivalence classes show that the tests of trade robustness and invariant trade robustness are
complementary. We have found some conspicuous examples of non-weighted games being k-trade
robust (or k′-invariant trade robust for some k′ ≥ k) but not k + 1-trade robust (or not k′ + 1-
invariant trade robust). We have incorporated a number of open questions in hopes of others
taking up the challenges that we have left where over.
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